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VoL.. XVI. DECEMBER, 1917 No. 2.
A MODERN EVOLUTION IN REMEDIAL RIGHTS,--THE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.
N a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
justice HOrMES makes this interesting observation:-
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although
in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain that power through-
out proceedings properly begun."'
An analysis of this language brings out a double antithesis. There
is first proposed a distinction between the existence and the exercise
of physical power as the basis of judicial authority. And there is
the further suggestion that this distinction, as a practical feature of
administrative justice, depends on the presence or absence, which
in effect means the degree, of civilization.
To paraphrase Justice HoLMES' statement we therefore have sub-
stantially the following proposition:
In early times the basis of jurisdiction is the existence and the
constant assertion of physical power over the parties to the action,
but as civilization advances the mere existence of such power tends
to make its exercise less and less essential.
If this is true, it must be because there is something in civiliza-
tion itself which diminishes the necessity for a resort to actual
force in sustaining the judgments of courts. And it is quite clear
that civilization does supply an element which is theoretically capable
of entirely supplanting the exercise of force in the assertion of
jurisdiction. This is respect for law. If the parties to the action
desire to obey the law, a mere determination by the court of their
reciprocal rights and duties is enough. No sheriff with his writ of
injunction or execution need shake the mailed fist of the State in
the faces of the litigants. The judgment of the court merely directs
McDonald v. Mabee (Decided March 6, 1917), 37 Sup. Ct. Reporter 343-
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the will of the parties, and the performance of duty becomes the
automatic consequence of the declaration of right.
It is not to be assumed that the peaceful acquiescence of the highly
civilized man in the legal findings of the court implies any loss of
power in the court itself. Quite the contrary. The greater the
ease with which the court's findings impose themselves on litigants,
the more the real power of the court is demonstrated. But the
force behind the finding of the court has become a latent instead
of an active force. This transition is possible, however, only when
the existence of the force is so well recognized and so clearly un-
derstood that no one would think it worth while to put it to the
test. The entire cessation of actual coercive measures on the part
of the court would therefore mark, not the disappearance, but the
perfection of the rule of force.
2
The modem observer, noting this correlation between socia
progress and the decline in the need for outward display of force
in the administration of justice, may well ask himself why we have
not done better than we appear to have done. If the existence of
force is enough, without its exercise, to sustain the court in its find-
ings, why do we not show a realization of that fact in our remedial
machinery? If the power of the state stands irresistibly behind
our judicial decisions, why take so much pains to clothe them with
the outward show of authority? Why display the sheriff and his
writ with so much ostentation? We do not arm our traffic police-
men with guns and cutlasses. Why insist that the court must al-
ways rattle the sabre?
To make a specific application of this general criticism, let it be
asked why our judicial system does not provide a means for merely
determining and declaring rights. If our civilization is not a sham,
and the state is understood to be equal to the task of enforcing the
decrees of its courts, a mere declaration may serve every purpose
of an order, and the order will become unnecessary. A declara-
tion by the court that A is entitled to the immediate possession of
a chattel in B's possession, should be equally effective in A's behalf
as a judgment that A do have and recover of B the possession
of the chattel. A judicial declaration that a certain city ordinance
is invalid ought to serve equally as well as an injunction against its
enforcement. Furthermore, the remedial possibilities in such
declaratory judgments are much greater than in judgments for re-
lief, and they open up an entirely new field for judicial usefulness,
as will be hereinafter pointed out.
2 Salmond, jurisprudence, Ed. 4, P. 66.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. L. Rev.  70 1917-1918
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The answer to the question, why our courts do not make declara-
tions of right, with or without relief, is probably historical, and
lies in the philosophical conceptions of rights and remedies which
have long been current in common law jurisprudence.
The common law was wedded to the idea of a wrongful act on
somebody's part as a necessary condition precedent to judicial action.
Thus HoIIAND, speaking of remedial rights, or rights of re-
course to courts of justice, says :--"The causes, or 'investitive facts,'
of remedial rights are always infringements of antecedents rights
* ** . And again, he says: "So long as all goes well, the action
of the law is dormant. When the balance of justice is disturbed
by wrongdoing, or even by a threat of it, the law intervenes to re-
store, as far as possible, the status quo ante."' And in still further
emphasis of this same characteristic of the court, as an ex post facto
agency, he says :--4If all went smoothly, antecedent, or primary,
rights would alone exist. Remedial, or sanctioning, rights are
merely part of the machinery provided by the State for the redress
of injury done to antecedent rights. This whole department of law
is, in an especial sense 'added because of transgressions'.",,
SAL.moND expresses the same view as to the function of courts
and the conditions under which they may be used by litigants. He
says :-"Both in civil and in criminal proceedings there is a wrong
(actual or threatened) complained of. ror the law will not en-
force a right except as against a person who has already violated
it, or who has at the least already shown an intention of doing so.
justice is administered only against wrongdoers, in act or in in-
tent."5
One of he most widely quoted analyses of a remedial right,
which is merely the right to resort to a court of justice, is that
made by PoMEROY, in which he says:--" * * Every remedial
right arises out of an antecedent primary right and corresponding
duty and a delict or breach of such primary right and duty by the
person on whom the duty rests. Every judicial action must there-
fore involve the following elements: a primary right possessed by
the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the
defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which con-
sisted in a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right
in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the de-
fendant springing from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief
3 Jurisprudence, Ed. 9, P. 310.
4 Jurisprudence, p. 3o6.
3 Jurisprudence, p. z39.
0 jurisprudence, P. 71.
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itself. Every action, however complicated or however simple, must
contain these essential elements."
7
The foregoing views make no distinction between legal and equit-
able actions, but treat remedial rights generically.
That the two divisions of the law operate upon the same theory
of remedial justice, in respect of the point now under consideration,
is quite obvious. Thus, injunctions are granted to restrain threat-
ened wrongs, specific performance is decreed in case of breach of
certain contracts, various remedies are available against those who
are guilty of fraud or whose claims wrongfully rest on accident or
mistake, an accounting may be had to test the accounts of those who
are charged to have profited at the plaintiff's expense, titles are
quieted against those wrongfully asserting rights hostile to the title
of the plaintiff. In the case of bills for discovery, there is usually
an action at law to which the bill is ancillary, and furthermore the
party against whom the discovery is sought may be deemed to be
wrongfully refusing to disclose. In all of these cases coercive re-
lief is granted. A single exception serves only to make the rule
more striking , and this is the administrative control exercised by
courts of equity over trusts, permitting a resort by the trustee to the
court to obtain a judicial construction of his powers and responsi-
bilities under the terms of the trust instrument.
Proof of the accuracy of this summary of the attitude of courts of
equity, in accordance with which they refuse to take jurisdiction of
cases not calling for coercive relief, may be found in the express
language of our courts. Thus in Woods v. Fuiler,8 the Supreme
Court of Maryland said:--"A Court of equity will not take juris-
diction, unless it can afford immediate relief * * * It must be borne in
mind that the decree of a Court of equity, and not its opinion, is the
instrument through which it acts in granting relief. However sound
and clear such opinion may be, as an abstract proposition of law,
yet if the principle it declares cannot be carried into effect by a
decree, in the case in which it is given, it is wholly valueless, and
an idle and nugatory act."
In Greeley v. Ncashu&a the city of Nashua filed a bill to de-
termine its rights to certain property devised to it under a will,
and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said:--"The plaintiffs
* * * request the court to inform them what their legal rights and
those of the defendants are in the property devised. The court
might with equal propriety be called upon by the parties interested
I Code Remedies (4th Ed.), Sec. 347.
9 (x884) 6z Md. 4S7.
9 (x882) 62 N. H. z66.
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to advise them regarding the title to land, the construction of a
contract, or any other question of law. Such questions are not
ordinarily adjudicated until it becomes necessary to decide them in
proceedings instituted for the redress of wrongs"'
And in Bevans v. Bevans 0 a bill was filed to obtain the con-
struction of a will with respect to the title to real estate. The
Chancellor of New Jersey said:-" * * * It is settled that the
court will not express opinions in regard to construction for the
mere information of parties, disconnected from some equitable re-
lief sought."
In accordance with this view of the defendant as an alleged
wrongdoer, and the action as one founded upon his actual or threat-
ened wrong, it is quite true that a judgment for relief against him
would always be appropriate, and would fully meet the situation.
So the law reasoned, and so it ruled. If coercive relief might al-
ways be granted, it ought always to be granted, f'r why make a
mere declaration of right against a wrongdoer who is before the
court and subject to its power. Why merely tell him that he has
no right to do as he proposes when the court can just as well pro-
hibit the act. Why merely advise when it can as well command?
The United States has, in every department of its legal practice,
accepted without question the foregoing theory of remedial justice.
We have not allowed our developing civilization, with its constantly
increasing respect for law, to produce any effect upon judicial func-
tions. We refuse to allow parties to appear in court except under
conditions which permit a display of force by the judicial arm
of the state.
England has been much more enterprising. In 1852 parliament
took the first step.to abandon this archaic conception of remedial
law. In that year 'an act was passed amending the practice of the
High Court of Chancery, and one of the sections of that act pro-
vided as follows:-
"No Suit in the said Court shall be open to Objection on the
Ground that a merely declaratory Decree or Order is sought thereby,
and it shall be lawful for the Court to make binding Declarations
of Right without granting consequential Relief."
11
This statute, while striking in its novelty, was subject to strict
limitations. It applied only to Courts of Chancery, and it was con-
strued to embrace only those cases where there was consequential
relief which might be granted, but which the parties did' not care
20 (i9o5) 69 N. J. 1-q. i.
31 15 and x6 Vict., c. 86, s. So.
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to ask for or receive."' It did not authorize anybody who had an
apprehension that some day, in the happening of some possible
event, another might make a claim against him, to institute a suit
to have it declared that there was no ground of claim.1 3 It did not,
in other words, authorize a declarator, as this proceeding was used
in certain situations under the Scotch law."
But while the act was so closely circumscribed in its operation, the
judges did not seem to be entirely agreed that there was any real
occasion for so narrow a restriction upon declarations of right.
Thus in Jackson v. Turnley 5 the Vice Chancellor said :--"Now it
is urged that it would be extremely convenient, if whenever a party
has reason to apprehend that another will make an attack upon
him, he should be entitled to come to this Court, and to ask to be
relieved from that danger, by having it declared by a decision that
there is no such right; * * * nor do I see that from the exercise of
it [such a jurisdiction] any mischief could result to the Defend-
ant."
And in 1876, in Cox v. Barker,0 JAmEs, L. J., referring to the
cases construing this statute, said that it appeared to him "the
Court adopted rather a narrow view * * * ." But the court never
attempted to enlarge the scope of the statute by construction.
But reforms moved swiftly in England. In 1873 the Judicature
Act completely broke the shackles with which conventionality had
burdened the administration of justice. And in the rejuvenation
which the law experienced, all the limitations upon declaratory
judgments which the old statute had retained, were swept away.
The new rule was put into force in 1883, as Rule 5 of Order 25,
and provided as follows :-
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on the ground
that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and
the Court may make binding declarations of right whether any
consequential relief is or could be claimed or -not:"
This rule introduced "an innovation of a very important kind",
to use the words of Justice LINDLYY.7 It threw open to the court
the right to do just what the Chancellor of New Jersey declared in
Bevans v. Bevans (supra), that courts would never do, namely,
12Rooke v. Lord Kensington (r8s6), 2 K- & 3. 753, 76r.
'3jackson v. Turnley (853), 1 Drew. 6X7, 627.
1"Rooke v. Lord Kensington (supra); Grove i. Bastard, 2 Ph. 6r9; Erskine on
the Law of Scotland, 46!.
is Supra, note 13, at p. 626.
13 Ch. D. 359, 370.
" Ellis v. Duke of Bedford (899). 1 Ch. 494, S15.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. L. Rev.  74 1917-1918
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
"'express opinions in regard to construction for the mere informa-
tion of parties * * * "
Later, another rule was added which is probably to be deemed
a mere specification of a class of cases originally embraced within
the terms of the foregoing rule, which provided in express words
that-
"In any Division of the High Court, any person claiming to be
interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may ap-
ply by originating summons for the determination of any question
of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declaration
-of the rights of the persons interested."
18
For thirty-five years the English courts have exercised this juris-
-diction, both at law and in equity, of advising parties as to their
rights, with or without coercive relief at the option of the parties.
Now, two different cases, based upon different principles, are
presented 'by the present English rules.
i. We have first the case where coercive relief might be had,
but it is not desired. Here there is merely a new remedial right
granted to the plaintiff. He has a cause of action of the conventional
type, but he wants to use it for a new purpose. Instead of asking
that the defendant be ordered to perform his contract, he only
wants the court to assure him and inform the defendant that 
he
lias a right to performance. Instead of enjoining the defendant
from taking certain action, he merely asks the court to advise him
and the defendant whether the latter has a right to take it.
The advantages of asking advice instead of coercive relief are
important. In the first place it presents in the pleading a specific
and express issue of law, which can usually be answered yes or no
and which will settle the controversy between the parties. In this
way the scope of the legal inquiry presented by the pleadings is
clarified and limited. Furthermore, the issue of law is not one
which must, as in case of a demurrer, be developed without any ac-
-companying issue of fact. It is usually an issue of law to be de-
-cided upon the outcome of the trial - or hearing, so that almost
every case is capable of being presented as a case for advice. Thus
a declaration of right may be asked as to a contract which plaintiff
-alleges contains certain provisions. If the defendant denies some
of the terms alleged, the declaration of right will be based on the
-terms which the evidence substantiates. If one were inclined to
question the advantage of this procedure in simplifying the issues,
a glance through some of the current English reports would con-
-vince him of its effect. The question to be decided is always the
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correctness of the declaration asked, and the court has only to-
answer the specific questions thus put to it.
By asking for the declaration of right the party makes definite
and certain the theory of his case, and the court is never at a loss.
to understand exactly what is in issue between the parties.
2. But there is a second result which this procedure accom-
plishes in cases where coercive relief might be had, and that is a.
psychological one. Every case may by this means become, in ap-
pearance at least, a friendly suit. There is no doubt that the per-.
sonal animosities developed by litigation are serious drawbacks to
the usefulness of the courts. To sue is to fight, and fights make
endless feuds. Parties hesitate to resort to the courts because they
shrink from a state of war with their neighbors or business as-
sociates. But if the courts could operate as diplomatic instead of
belligerent agencies, less hesitation would be felt over recourse to.
them, and less strain would be put upon the friendly relations of the
parties. 'To ask the court merely to say whether you have certain
contract rights as against the defendant is a very different thing
from demanding damages or an injunction against him. When yotx
ask for a declaration of right only, you treat him as a gentleman.
When you ask coercive relief you treat him as a wrongdoer. That
is the whole difference between diplomacy and war; the former
assumes that both parties wish to do right, the latter is based on
an accusation of wrong. A request for a declaration of right plainly
implies full confidence that the defendant will promptly and volun-
tarily do his duty as soon as the court points it out to him. It
indicates a willingness to rely on the defendant's sense of honor,
as a sufficient remedy. It makes the law suit a coiperative proceed-
ing, in which the court merely assists the parties to settle their
own differences -by stating to them the rules of law which govern
them.
These considerations alone are enough to recommend the prac-
tice in any country where respect for the rights of others is con-
sidered a virtue. The force behind the court is not at all weak-
ened by it, for if it appears that the plaintiff's confidence in the
defendant's readiness to do right is misplaced, the coercive decree
of the court is always ready to be promptly issued in support of
its declaration.
An entirely different situation, however, is presented in those
cases where no coercive relief can be granted. Here there is an
entire absence of a cause of action in the conventional sense. Since
the defendant has not yet done or threatened anything wrong, nor
failed to do all that is lawfully incumbent upon him, there is noth-
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ing for the court to operate upon, if we accept the definitions of
a cause of action set forth in an earlier portion of this article. If
remedial rights arise only in support of primary rights infringed
or threatened, there can be no remedial right of any kind in such
cases.
To account for the right to a declaratory judgment in cases where
no relief is possible, it seems necessary to boldly concede that the
statute which authorizes it has created not a new remedy merely,
but a new primary right. The old primary rights were the correla-
tives of duties calling for present action on the part of the de-
fendant. These were infringed when the defendant failed to do
what the law required. They were all based on a social system
which considered justice as a by-product of force, and which saw
no need for judicial administration concerning itself with any but
wrongdoers. The common law never looked upon the courts as
agencies useful for enabling parties to keep out of trouble. That
was the business of the lawyers. It never admitted that any one
had a legal right to know what his rights were.
The new rule authorizing declaratory judgments in cases where
no relief is possible, gives one the right to know his rights. Since
ignorance of the law excuses no one, the law will furnish an oracle
to declare it. Assuming that parties intend to do right, it will point
out the way they should go. To use a homely figure, prior to 1883
the English courts were employed only as repair shops; since that
time they have been operated as service stations.
The field which the new rule opens is a wide and fruitful one,
and by contrast makes the old practice, which is of course the cur-
rent American practice, seem incredibly stupid. It furnishes rem-
edies which no civilized country ought to deny to its citizens, and
the lack of them is a serious hardship in this country.
The practice of making declarations of right has completely
revolutionized English remedial law. The American lawyer who
peruses the current English reports is bewildered by their novelty.
He is like a modern Rip Van Winkle, who, having gone to sleep
in an age when courts were only the nemesis of wrongdoers, awak-
ens to find that they have become the guardians and advisers of
those who respect the law.
The only recourse of an American who wishes to get a forecast
of his rights is to consult his lawyer. But the lawyer's opinion is
without the slightest binding force. Vast interests may be at
stake, but all the client can do is to gamble on the sagacity of his
counsel.
In England such compulsory gambling has been outgrown. The
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client consults *his lawyer, the lawyer, in case of doubt, frames a
case for the court, and the court, on a full hearing with all in-
ferested parties before it, makes a final and binding declaration on
which the client can act with perfect security. The practice is so
convenient and so obviously advantageous that it has become al-
most a matter of course in English chancery cases and is very
common on the law side of the court. An examination of the last
volume of Chancery reports, volume 2 for 1916, shows that out
of 64 cases reported, 43 were brought for declarations of right.
The advance sheets of the Law Journal, for September, 1917,
show 15 Chancery cases of which 12 were brought for declara-
tions. It would be safe to say that approximately two-thirds of the
current Chancery litigation in the Supreme Court of Judicature
is directed to obtaining the advice of the court as to rights of
litigant parties, with or without prayers for consequential relief.
The cases in the volume of chancery reports above mentioned
will illustrate the nature and range of questions put to the court
for determination. Thus, in Lovesy v. Palmer,
19 plaintiff asked
for a declaration that certain memoranda and letters constituted a
binding contract between the defendants and the plaintiff to make
a lease of a theatre. In Smith, Coney & Barrett v. Becker, Gray
& Co.,20 the plaintiff asked for declarations that certain contracts
which they had made with defendants were illegal by reason of
the proclamation of a state of war between Great Britain and Ger-
many. In Re Lodwigl the plaintiff asked the court to declare
whether certain trusts were void for remoteness. In Re New
Chinese Antimony Co., LiM., 22 the liquidator of a company asked
the court to determine and declare the correlative rights of the
preferred and common shareholders in the assets of the company.
In Re Chafer and Randalls Contract23 plaintiff asked a declaration
that the abstract of title delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff
did not show a good title. In Cassel v. Inglis24 plaintiff asked the
court to declare that he had been illegally excluded from member-
ship in the Stock Exchange. In Coleman v. London County and
Westminster Bank, Lim.,2  the court was asked to decide the ques-
tion of priorities in certain debentures as between the plaintiff and
Is Order 54 A, rule z, passed in 1893.
(19x6) 2 Ch. 233.
n (z916) 2 Ch. 86.
= (1916) 2 Ch. 26.
= (19x6) 2 Ch. x5.
2 (1916) 2 Ch. 8.
"6 (xx6) 2 Ch. 22.
s (2916) 2 Ch. 353.
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defendant. In Parsons v. Equitable Investment Co., LirV.,
26 the
court was asked to declare that a certain bill of sale was void be-
cause it failed to truly state the consideration for which it was
given. In Pearce v. Bultee 7 a declaration was asked as to who
were the owners of certain property. In Gilbert v. Gosport and
Alverstoke Urban District Council28 plaintiff asked the. court to de-
clare that he owned certain land free of any public right of way.
In a majority of the above cases there was a present cause of action
in the plaintiff, which was either utilized as the basis for a claim
for relief in addition to the declaration of rights, or was abandoned
in favor of the declaration as a better remedy.
In at least twenty cases in the same volume the court was asked
to construe wills or make declarations as to rights acquired under
wills, involving such-questions as :-whether certain funds should
be paid to a life tenant as income or retained by the trustees as
capital,29 whether the words "lawful issue" were restricted to chil-
dren or included remoter descendants, 0 to what bequests a pro-
vision against lapse applied,s' whether farm laborers were "serv-
ants" within the meaning of a bequest,
82 whether a devise of land
was subject to a water pipe easement
3 and many others, most of
them involving, but others not involving, trusts.
The cases where a declaration of rights is the sole possible rem-
edy are not easy to classify. Perhaps no logical classification is
possible, for the whole matter of declaratory judgments is discre-
tionary with the court, and each case seems to go on its own facts
as an appeal to the exercise of that discretion. The scope of the
applications for such declarations which the courts have approved,
and the corresponding limitations upon the remedial possibilities
in American practice, may be roughly shown under the following
heads, merely as a means of convenient presentation.
I. A declaration of rights may be had where there is a present
possibility of immediately creating a cause of action, as by a de-
mand or refusal, but the parties have not done so, perhaps through
reluctance to precipitate a conflict. This is the typical case for a
friendly application to the court. It avoids the necessity of formal
hostilities, such as American friendly suits require, and enables
26 (riq6) 2 Ch. 527.
2 (x9x6) z Ci. 544.
23 (x916) 2 Ch. 587.
."In re Thomas (igx6), 2 Ch. 331.
3In re Timson (1916), 2 Ch. 362.
= In re Smith (WL6), 2 Ch. 368.
"In re Forrest (1916), z Ch. 386.
"Schwann v. Cotton (1916), 2 Ch. 459.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. L. Rev.  79 1917-1918
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
the parties to show on the face of the record that there has been
a forbearance of any peremptory action. Thus, while an action
on a contract, either for specific performance or damages, requires
the allegation and proof of abreach by the defendant, a declaration
-of rights would seem to be available without any such allegation.
In Williams, Hollins & Co., Lim., v. Paget"' defendant was a
manager employed by the plaintiff, under a salary and a contract
for additional compensation equal to 5% of any excess earned over
and above full preferred dividends of 5% and common dividends
of 7o. In 1915 the company made profits in excess of the pre-
war standard, so that an excess profits tax became payable unar
the Finance Act. The question then arose whether the manager's
additional compensation should be estimated before or after the
-deduction of the excess profits tax. Instead of creating a cause of
action for damages by a demand on the part of the manager for
-compensation on the higher basis of computation, the parties ob-
tained a declaration from the court as to the true basis.
In Rawlinson v. Mort3" the court made a declaration that a cer-
tain organ, which had come rightfully into the possession of the de-
fendants, was the property of the plaintiff, although no demand
for it had ever been made upon the defendants.
In H. Newsum & Co., Lim., v. Bradley,3 the plaintiffs were in-
dorsees of bills of lading for the carriage of a cargo of wood in
defendant's steamship Jupiter from Archangel to Hull. The ship
was torpedoed by a German submarine, and the crew were com-
1elled by the enemy to leave her. Subsequently she was towed into
a Scottish port by a British patrol boat, and the plaintiffs claimed
the right to take possession of the goods without payment of freight.
The parties agreed to allow the ship to proceed with her cargo to
Hull subject to plaintiff's rights as of the date when she lay in
-the Scottish port, and this action was commenced for a declaration
by the court as to what those rights were, no demand or refusal
appearing to have been made. The declaration was given as asked
by the plaintiffs.
An extremely large and varied class of cases of this kind arises
-out of the construction of written instruments, fixing the mutual
rights of parties. Here present claims for relief might be created
through action by one party hostile to the rights asserted by an-
other party, but under Order 54A, Rule i, such a course is rendered
-entirely unnecessary. A doubt having arisen as to the meaning or
34 (z91) 86 L. J. Ch. 287.
(xo5) 93 L. T. 555.
(r97) 86 L. 3. T. B. x238.
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effect of the instrument, this is enough to make it possible for any
Iparty concerned to present to the court the question upon which the
doubt hinges.
A typical case is Cyclists' Touring Club v. Hopkinson," where
'certain members of the plaintiff club desired to grant a pension to
the club's secretary, who had filled that office for many years. A
minority voted against the pension. The question was raised
-whether under the articles of association such action would be
valid, and this action was brought solely to determine the question
of power under the articles, no action having been take nor threat-
ened pursuant to the vote to grant the pension. The court declared
that the granting of such a pension would not be ultra vires.
In Re Smith 8 the plaintiffs asked the court to declare that by
virtue of a certain contract made by them with one Smith, in his
lifetime, they were entitled to have Smith's executors execute to
them a legal mortgage upon certain property belonging to the estate
-as security for certain advances. The declaration was made.
Similar instances might be indefinitely multiplied, but the prin-
ciple underlying them is plain and seems to call for no further illus-
traction. American practice limits bills for instructions to cases
where there is some independent ground of equitable jurisdiction,
such as trusts. 9
2. Where one party only has a present right of action for legal
,or equitable relief, but the other will suffer a serious prejudice
by delay in bringing it into court, the latter may have a declaration
of rights.
Under American practice the courts can give the latter party no
relief. He must helplessly wait until the party who has the cause
of action chooses to sue him, even though the delay serves only to
pile up the damages which he may eventually have to pay.
For example, suppose A claims that B is infringing his patent.
B has a cause of action of the conventional type, but A has not.
B§ can sue A but A cannot sue B. B may have a large investment
in the machinery for making the disputed device, and may have
spent large sums in advertising it. Upon B's assertion of patent
rights A must either discard his machinery, abandon his invest-
ment, and lose the good will be has built up, or continue to operate
under the constant threat of an action for damages whenever A
thinks that sufficiently large damages have accrued to make a law
suit a profitable venture. If a declaration of rights could be had,
0 (igog) xor L. T. 848.
(1916) 2 Ch. 206.
" Whitehouse Equity, Sec. 129.
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the manufacturer could at once apply for a determination of the
validity of the asserted patent, and thus save himself from the
risk of serious loss and injury.
Such was the case presented in North Eastern Marine Engineer-
izg Co. v. Leeds Forge Co.,4' where defendants claimed that plain-
tiffs were infringing their patents. Plaintiffs asked for a declara-
tion that defendants' patents were invalid and that plaintiffs had
not invaded any of defendants' legal rights. The court held that
the giving of declaratory judgments was discretionary, and that in
this case there was an adequate remedy provided by the PATENTS,
DxSiGNS and TRADiwARKs Acr, xamely, a petition for the revoca-
tion of the patent, hence no declaration would be made. But in the
court of appeal, upon a showing that such a petition had already
been presented, but leave to file it had been refused for the probable
reason that the patent had expired, a declaration was made that
the mere fact of the expiration of the patent was not sufficient to
justify the Attorney-General in refusing permission to file a peti-
tion for revocation. The whole course of reasoning of the court
sustains the conclusion that if the plaintiff had been without any
other remedy, as of course he would have been in the United
States,41 a declaration of rights as requested might have been made.
Another common instance of such a situation occurs where one
makes separate contracts with two other parties, and one or each
of the latter claims that his contract is broken by the contract
with the other, as where two jobbers each claim exclusive rights in
the same territory under separate contracts with the manufacturer.
Here the manufacturer has no present cause of action for relief,
and can only wait until sued by one or both of the jobbers' This
situation is always possible where contemporary contracts are made
with different persons respecting the same subject matter. Pro-
vision for declarations of rights would offer a satisfactory solution
and would merely put into force the equitable rule of mutuality of
remedy.
3. Where the plaintiff has no ground for relief but there is a
probability, though not a threat, that the defendant may assert
rights hostile to him, a.declaration of rights may be had.
In Hopkinson v. Mortimer, Harley & Co.1 plaintiff was the
owner of full paid shares in defendant company. The company
added a provision to their articles that the lien and right of for-
40 (z9o6) i Ch. 324.
" The remedy offered under American practice is limited to a finding upon con.
flicting patents. U. S. R. S., Sec. 4918.
42 (xgz) 86 L. 3. Ch. 467.
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feiture which it had always had on part paid shares for debts due
the company should be extended to full paid shares. The company
disclaimed any intention of exercising this power. The plaintiff
asked for a declaration that his full paid shares were not subject
to forfeiture. It was held that this was a proper declaration and
not premature, as his rights were invaded by the mere passage of
the resolution.
4. Where a cause of action for relief is in a condition which
might be called inchoate, and lapse of time is necessary to perfect
it, the court will declare the rights of the parties.
48
In Austen v. Collins" a will created a life estate with successive
remainders, with the proviso that if any devisee should refuse or
neglect for one year to take and bear the surname and arms of
Austen, then the devise should terminate, ana the property should
at once go to the person next in remainder. The plaintiff was the
life tenant, and after the College of Arms had refused him permis-
sion to use the arms required, and before the year had elapsed,
he asked for a declaration that he had not forfeited his life estate.
The declaration was made as asked.
In West v. Lord Sackville" the plaintiff claimed that he was the
lawful and eldest son of Lord Sackville, defendant, and was en-
, Even before z852, when the first legislation authorized declaratory 
judgments in
England, courts of chancery had sometimes undertaken to pronounce 
such judgments,
and they were deemed only technically irregular. Thus, in Curtis 
v. Sheffield (x882), 21
Ch. D. i, it appeared that in 1836 in an administration suit, Vice-Chancellor 
Shadwell
made seven declarations of right as to seven legacies given by the will 
of the testator.
"He declared the rights of the parties entitled to present interests, and 
also their rights
in the future after the deaths of the various tenants for life. Those declarations 
were
made in the presence of all the children of the testator who were 
then living-they
appear to have been of age, and they appeared by counsel and argued 
the various
questions which were decided by the Court. Now it is true that it is not 
the prac-
tice of the Court, and was not the practice of the Court of Chancery, 
to decide
as to future rights, but to wait until the event has happened, unless 
a present right
depends on the decisions, or there are some other special circumstances 
to safisfy
the Court that it is desirable at once to decide on the future rights. 
But where
all the parties who in any event will be entitled to the property are of age 
and are
ready to argue the case, the reason of the rule departs, and it becomes 
a bare
technicality. The reason for the rule is this, that the Court will not decide 
on future
rights, because until the event happens it does not know who may be interested 
in
arguing the question, and therefore may be shutting out parties who, when 
the event
happens, may be entitled to succeed, but where they are all of age, and every 
possible
party is represented before the Court, as I said before, utility seems to say that 
there
should be a power to determine their rights, as is the case in Scotland and in 
many
other countries.'--Jessel, M. R.
The opinion proceeds to say that there probably were not any special circumstances
in this case, because Vice-Chancellor Shadwell frequently disregarded the rule, hut 
at
most it was a technical irregularity, and the plaintiff, the surviving child, 
cannot now
re-open the question, but is bound by the original declarations.
"4 (1886) 54 T. T. 903.
a (1903) 2 Ch. 378.
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titled under a certain settlement to an estate in tail male, expectant
on the decease of Lord Sackville ,in the family estates. He alleged
that he could not bring his claim to trial during the lifetime of Lord
Sackville, and brought this action to perpetuate testimony as to his
claims. This relief was denied, but STIRmNG, J., suggested that in
his opinion an action might have been brought under Order 25,
Rule 5, for a declaration of his title to the estates as tenant in
tail in remainder expectant on the death of his father.
In Powell & Thomas v. Evans Jones & Co0
6 defendants filed a
counterclaim against an agent for the portion of his commission
which had already been paid to him, on the theory that he had re-
ceived the same to defendants' use, and then asked for and ob-
tained a declaration that he would become indebted to them for
any further sums when and as he should receive them on account
of said commission.
5. When the plaintiff has and can have no cause of action for
relief, but his dealings with third persons depend on the determina-
tion of questions arising between himself and the defendant, a
declaration of rights will be made.-
In Jenkins v. Price,'7 the lessee of a hotel wished to assign her
lease, but under its terms could not do so without the lessor's con-
sent, unless such consent was unreasonably refused. The lessor re-
fused. The lessee, in order to place herself in a position where she
could deal with her proposed assignee, asked for a declaration that,
the refusal was unreasonable and released her from the restriction
against assignment. This declaration was given.
Another case very similar to the last is West v. Gwynne'
8 where
a lease contained a condition against underletting unless with the
consent of the lessor. Plaintiffs, who were lessees by assignment,
asked permission to relet, but the lessor refused, except on condi-
tion that he should receive one-half the surplus rental the plain-
tiffs were to obtain. Plaintiffs, believing that this .condition was
invalid under the CONvEYAN cI, AcT, asked for a declaration to
that effect, and the court so declared. 9
Lord Justice VAUGHAN WILLIAMs, in a similar case"
0 used very
strong language in support of the practice, saying:--" * ** It
seems to me that it would be quite shocking if the Court could not
put an end to the dispute in the way the learned judge has done
44 (:goS) I K. B. 11.
41T (1907) 2
' Ch. zzg.
4 (1911) 2 Ch. X.
4A similar declaration was made in Evans v. Levy (1go, x Ch. 452.
5GYoung v. Ashley Gardens Properties, Lim. (1903), 2 Cl. 112.
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by this order. I mean it would be quite shocking if * * * the
Court were bound to say, 'Although we have the whole matter be-
fore us * * * we must leave matters in this state, that the land-
lord may continue to abstain from granting his license and the tenant
must assign at his own risk-that is, at the risk of forfeiture'."
And CozENs-HARDY, L. J., said in the same case, "I cannot imagine
a more judicious or beneficial exercise of the jurisdiction to make
a declaratory order than that which has been adopted by Joyce, J.
in this case."
A similar situation arises in case of attempted sales of property
in which others claim rights. The prospective purchaser does not
care to buy a lawsuit, and only by a declaration of right against the
claimant can the title be made merchantable in cases where a bill
to quiet title would not lie.
Thus, in Re Burroughs-Fowler,5
1 an antenuptial settlement con-
veyed real and personal property to trustees to sell the same and pay
the rents, profits and income to the husband during his life or until
he should be declared bankrupt or subject to certain other condi-
tions. The husband was later adjudicated a bankrupt, and the
trustee in bankruptcy offered this life interest of the bankrupt for
sale, but the prospective purchaser objected that this life interest
was defeasible. The trustee in bankruptcy thereupon applied for
a declaration that he was able to convey a good title to an in-
defeasible life interest of the bankrupt, and the court so declared.
In Re Trafford's Settled Estates
52 the applicant wished to sell
certain lands which he acquired under a will, freed from certain
annuities which were created by the same will. He could do so
only if he was a person having the powers of a tenant for life,
and asked for a declaration that he had such powers. The court
decided the question so presented.
6. -Where there is no present cause of action in the ordinary
sense but the accrual of such a cause of action will subject the
plaintiff to the risk of penalties, the court will declare the rights
of the parties.
In such a case the plaintiff is not required to incur the risk of
the penalties, but may obtain a declaration to inform himself of
his rights in anticipation of penal liability. The question was thor-
oughly argued in a number of cases involving the inquisitorial pow-
ers of crown officers, and the judges all agreed that the anticipatory
declaration of rights was an eminently suitable remedy.
mt (igx6) 2 Ch. 251.
53(191S) I Ch. 9.
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Thus, in Burghes v. Attorney-General the Commissioners of in-
ternal revenue had required plaintiff to make certain returns respect-
ing rents paid out or received, for the purpose of fixing duties on
land values. . The plaintiff asked the court for a declaration that
he was not bound to give the information demanded. WAMUNGT ON,
J., said:
"It is contended that there is no cause of action against the Crown
or its officers, that they have broken no contract and have done the
plaintiff no legal wrong, nor do they threaten to do so. But Order
25, r. 5, is intended to deal with the very case-that is, one in which
no relief can be claimed either by way of damages for the past or
an injunction for the future, and, in fact, in several cases declara-
tions have been made under this Order where there was no cause
of action in the proper sense * * *
"The complaint is that officers of the Crown are demanding in-
formation they are not entitled to, and, to say the least of it, re-
minding the subject of unpleasant consequences which may ensue
if it is refused. It seems to me inmaterial whether the terms of
the notice amount to an actual threat; the reference to the penalty
is plainly intended to intimate to the plaintiff that compliance can,
and will, be compelled if necessary. If the question be not decided
in this way it must be left open until the plaintiff, having refused
to comply, is sued for penalties, and the plaintiff would be left
in a position of great perplexity. In my opinion, the mode adopted,
by the plaintiff for obtaining a decision is a very convenient one,
enabling the Commissioners to be informed how far they may go,
and relieving thie plaintiff from the doubt and perplexity into which
he has been cast."
Another action of the same kind was brought in the King's Bench
Division, and the Court of Appeal took the Same view as WAR-
RINGTON, J., in the Burghes case. This was Dyson v. Attorney-Gen-
eral," in which FARWI, ., L. J., speaking in the Court of Appeal,
said:-
"It is obviously a question of the greatest importance; more than
eight millions of Form IV [the form on which the information was
required to be given] have been sent out in England, and the ques-
tions asked entail much trouble and in many cases considerable ex-
pense in answering; it would be a blot on our system of law and
procedure if there is no way by which a decision on the true limit
of the power of inquisition vested in the Commissioners can be ob-
tained by any member of the public aggrieved, without putting him-
53 (igin) 2 Ch. 139, 155.
54 (1gx) i K. B. 4tO, 421 f.-
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. L. Rev.  86 1917-1918
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
self in the invidious position of being sued for a penalty * * *
The next argument on the Attorney-General's behalf was 'ab in-
convenienti'; it was said that if an action of this sort would lie there
would be innumerable actions for declarations as to the meaning
of numerous Acts, adding greatly to the labours of the law of-
ficers. But the Court is not bound to make declaratory orders and
would refuse to do so unless in proper cases, and would punish
with costs persons who might bring unnecessary actions: there is no
substance in the apprehension, but if inconvenience is a legitimate
consideration at all, the convenience in the public interest is all in
favour of providing a speedy and easy access to the Courts for
any of His Majesty's subjects who have any real cause of com-
plaint against the exercise of statutory powers by Government de-
partments and Governemnt officials, having regard to their grow-
ing tendency to claim the right to act without regard to legal prin-
ciples and without appeal to any Court * * * If ministerial re-
sponsibility were more than the mere shadow of a name, the mat-
ter would be less important, but as it is, the Courts are the only.
defence of the liberty of the subject against departmental aggres-
sion."
And still later, in Dyson v. Attorney-General, 
5 the Court of Ap-
peal repeated the same views very strongly, FL1TCHZR MOULTON,
L. J., saying: " * * * I think that an action thus framed is the
most convenient method of dnabling the subject to test the justifia-
bility of proceedings on the part of permanent officials purporting
to act under statutory provisions."
7. Where plaintiff as a strict matter of law, has a right to an
injunction, yet on account of the peculiar facts of the case the
court may prefer to substitute a declaration of right as a more
suitable remedy.
In Vestry of St. Mary, Islington v. Hornsey Urban District Coun-
cil,6, the plaintiffs, a metropolitan vestry, agreed to allow defend-
ants, a district outside the metropolitan area, to discharge their
sewage into plaintiffs' sewer, but after many years operation it
was found that this additional sewage periodically stopped up
plaintiffs' sewer. The agreement was ultra vires and void. The
plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain defendants from dis-
charging sewage into plaintiffs' sewers. It was held that while
the court had power to grant the injunction, yet, in view of the
difficulty in which it would place defendants if obliged to close
(1gx) x Ch. x58, 168.
(xgoo) x Ch. 69S.
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sewers in daily use, the Court would only make a declaration estab-
lishing plaintiffs' right to relief, to give defendants time to make
other arrangements, with leave to apply for an injunction after the
expiration of a reasonable time.
In Llandulno Urban District Council v. Woods,
57 the plaintiffs
were the local authority of Llandudno, and the seashore at that
point between high and low watermark was vested in them under
a lease from the Crown. Defendant was a clergyman of the Church
of England, and asked permission to hold religious services on
the beach. Plaintiffs refused, but the defendant held them not-
withstanding. The plaintiff asked a declaration that defendant
was not entitled to make addresses or hold meetings on the shore
at Llandudno without their consent, and an injunction. It was
held that since the plaintiffs possess the legal right to prohibit any-
one from coming upon the shore, the declaration asked will have to
be given, but the matter is too trivial to merit the use of an in-
junction.
8. Where relief can only be granted in a foreign jurisdiction,
the respective rights of the parties may be fixed by a declaration as
an aid to the foreign adjudication.
In The Manar,58 the plaintiffs were mortgagees of the British
ship Manar, and on default in payment of the mortgage they had
taken possession and chartered the ship for a voyage to France.
On arrival there the defendants, Strachan Brothers, British sub-
jects, arrested the ship and freight, claiming as creditors of the
mortgagors for necessaries furnished to the ship. It appeared to
be in dispute whether the French court would apply the English
law in determining whether the plaintiffs as mortgagees or the de-
fendants as necessaries men were entitled to the possession of the
ship and freight. The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that they
were entitled to the ship and freight as against defendants. It was
held that since it was not clear from the evidence what effect a
judgment in this action would have in France, and since it had not
been shown that the declaration sought would not be of practical
utility to plaintiffs in the French Court, the declaration would be
given.
It seems quite evident that England has far surpassed this coun-
try in devising remedial methods calculated to make the courts
useful and available under the exacting requirements of modern
(1899) 2 Ch. 70S.
o (1903) P. 9s.
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civilization. We have canonized the ancient tradition of a cause
of action, in all its original crudeness, and have made it the condi-
tion and the measure of judicial action. We have failed utterly
to see the enormous and far-reaching possibilities in preventive re-
lief,-prevention not merely of threatened wrongs but prevention
of uncertainty and misunderstanding in the assertion of rights. Yet
here is an effective, workable system, tried out under conditions
identical with those in our own country, which marks an advance
over previous doctrines comparable to the great reform which
equity made over the harsh rules of the common law. Its use would
entail no reconstruction of our judicial machinery, no readjustment
of other elements in our remedial system.
Its theory and operation are prefectly simple. By adopting the
language of the English rules, Order 25, Rule 5, authorizing declara-
tions of rights, and the supplementary, though possibly unneces-
sary, rule, Order 54A, Rule i, authorizing the judicial construction
of documents, we might enjoy the fruits of England's experience,
enriched as it is by the thirty-five years' labor which her courts have
devoted to charting the waters over which the applicant for a
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